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Abstract—Different countries have different privacy regula-
tory models. These models impact the perspectives and laws
surrounding internet privacy. However, little is known about
how effective the regulatory models are when it comes to
limiting online tracking and advertising activity. In this paper,
we propose a method for investigating tracking behavior by
analyzing cookies and HTTP requests from browsing sessions
originating in different countries. We collect browsing data from
visits to top websites in various countries that utilize different
regulatory models. We found that there are significant differences
in tracking activity between different countries using several
metrics. We also suggest various ways to extend this study which
may yield a more complete representation of tracking from a
global perspective.
I. INTRODUCTION
PRIVACY laws have been enacted worldwide with thepurpose of protecting internet users’ private information.
Privacy laws can be divided into four main models [1] that
differ in the scope and enforcement of regulation around digital
privacy. The scope may include protections for all digital data,
as in the comprehensive model; this is the model that has been
adopted in the European Union. Alternatively, the scope of
regulation protecting privacy may be limited and only protect
certain types of data, such as health or education data, or
certain classes of people, such as minors. This sectoral model
is most notably adopted in the United States. The third model
is co-regulatory; in this case, the scope may be similar to the
comprehensive model, but in this model the rules are enforced
by industry, as opposed to the state. Countries like Australia
have adopted this approach. Finally, some countries have no
legal or regulatory protection for digital privacy—a variety
of locations fall under this regime, including the People’s
Republic of China [1], [2]. These models impact how countries
handle privacy both legally and culturally, specifically in the
realms of online tracking and privacy legislation.
Web tracking is implemented in a variety of ways, some
of the most popular being third-party cookies and JavaScript
tracking code. Commercial websites utilize a diverse plethora
of trackers for various purposes such as targeted advertise-
ments. Although privacy laws vary in different countries, there
is currently a lack of information as to whether the number
and types of trackers differ between countries, and whether
this is impacted by different privacy regulation models. The
purpose of this paper is to establish a empirical method
for determining relationship between the amount of tracking
and various countries that employ different privacy regulatory
models.
In this study, we compared the amount of trackers on web-
sites that operate in various countries with different privacy
models. This paper offers three main contributions.
• We build, test, and describe an empirical, automated
method for measuring the amount of web tracking in
different countries, which can help determine the effec-
tiveness of different privacy regulatory models.
• We examine the level of web tracking in four different
countries representing three regulatory models, finding
significant differences between countries.
• We investigate whether the location of the user or the
location of the site is the factor that leads to differences in
tracking between countries, finding that the site’s country
is more important than the visitor’s country.
We have chosen Germany to represent the comprehensive
model, the United States and Japan to represent the sectoral
model, and Australia to represent the co-regulatory model. The
sites that we are interested in are Alexa Top 250 sites [3]
that have domains in multiple countries. We utilized Amazon
Web Services to visit and crawl the data from the websites by
servers in those countries.
We locate and identify these trackers using 3rd party HTTP
requests and cookies. In addition, we identify ads from the
websites by using a list provided by AdBlock browser ex-
tension [4]. Automation of the process is handled using the
OpenWPM [5] tool which allows for synchronization across
browsers and virtual machines ensuring that requests will
occur at the same time.
In the following sections, we will first review some related
work. Detailed descriptions of our method and experimental
results are stated in Section III and IV. Discussion and possi-
bilities for future work are described in Section V and VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Privacy in the news seems inescapable; a general con-
cern regarding the intrusiveness and pervasiveness of online
tracking, advertising, and monitoring has caught the public
attention. For example, concerns over the activities of social
networking sites and advertisers such as Facebook bring up
issues of anonymity and tracking in daily life [6]. Similarly,
the level of privacy protection put into place by industry
giants such as Google has come under scrutiny as jurisdictions
with more comprehensive privacy regulations have called the
effectiveness of their protections into question [7].
These worries also demonstrate the large amount of change
that the Internet has undergone in a relatively short amount
of time. As Mayer and Mitchell note [8], individual instances
of web content have evolved from a single-origin affair into a
conglomeration of “myriad unrelated ‘third-party’ websites,”
each facilitating anything from advertising to social media.
This has been demonstrated by Krishnamurthy and Wills
[9] in their longitudinal study, demonstrating what they term
an “increasing aggregation of user-related data by a steadily
decreasing number of entities.” Furthermore, this explosion
of third parties has existed an environment with little to no
regulation until very recently [8], with advances only occurring
in the comprehensive regulatory environment provided by the
European Union.
We give a brief introduction to the privacy regulatory
models. We then describe previous work in privacy-related
web measurement. Finally, we provide background on best
practices for web measurement methods.
A. Privacy Regulatory Models
Privacy regulations differ around the world [10], [11]. The
different regulatory models employed can be divided in several
ways. While we use the taxonomy of regulatory models
described below, other work has provided a more granular
categorization of regulatory models [11], [12]. The empirical
method described in this paper can be applied to either
taxonomy of privacy regulatory models, as long as countries
from all regulatory models are represented.
Different privacy regulation models around the world may
have different impacts on the market, technology, and law [1].
In this work, we examine four models of privacy regulation.
1) Comprehensive regulatory models view privacy as a
fundamental human right. They require companies and
organizations protect personal information by placing
limits on collection, use, and disclosure. A privacy
authority agency enforces privacy laws. This compre-
hensive model is adopted in the European Union [1].
2) In a sectoral model, the government enacts privacy laws
about a particular industry sector, for example in health
or finance, but does not provide fundamental protection
on privacy. The sectoral model is adopted in the United
States [2].
3) A co-regulatory model relies on industries to develop
their privacy policies for data protection. This is adopted
in Australia.
4) Finally, a mixed/no-policy model is describes the
regimes in which either privacy is not protected, or uses
a mix of the other three policies. According to Swire and
Ahmad, this model is adopted in the People’s Republic
of China [1].
B. Measuring Advertising and Tracking Activity
Online behavioral advertising and tracking is a well-studied
problem in the realm of privacy. While most users do per-
ceive the potential benefits of this sort of targeting, many
also express a “general, abstract notion of privacy violation”
stemming from these advertising and tracking techniques
[13]. Similar work concludes that these tracking techniques
“[violate] consumer expectations” and notes that many users
are generally unaware of the implications of behavioral ad-
vertising and tracking mechanisms such as cookies. These
“misconceptions” may lead to an inability for users to make
informed privacy decisions [14].
With this in mind, we decided to operationalize the presence
of online tracking in two different ways: the presence of third-
party cookies and the presence of third-party HTTP requests.
Third-party cookies are already an established metric for the
presence of advertising and tracking activity due to the fact
they come from a source other the website a user is visiting.
This usually indicates the presence of external content, some-
thing that often takes the form of an advertisement or tracking
tool [8]. Testing for the presence of third-party HTTP requests
is a natural extension of the cookie metric. As an HTTP
request is made every time an external resource is loaded by
the users web browser, analyzing requests unrelated to the
main site the browser is accessing can help detect the presence
of what Mayer and Mitchell term “third-party services” [8].
This also motivates our use of ad blocking lists as a heuristic
(expanded upon in our discussion of methods) as these tools
operate on a very similar detection principle.
C. Privacy-related Web Measurement
In order to address and understand the impact of new web
technologies on privacy, many efforts have been made to
advance the field of privacy-related web measurement in recent
years. Engelhardt et al. [15] have identified 32 studies that
they categorize as “web privacy measurement studies.” This
category of study has great breadth, ranging from technical
analyses of information leaked by web scripting languages
[16] to empirical analyses of search engine personalization
[17]. In this vein, numerous comparison-style studies have also
been run, touching on diverse subjects such as discrimination
in online advertising [18] and the effectiveness of online
privacy tools [19].
The above studies make valuable contributions by taking
on tasks like revealing the sources of potential privacy harms,
detailing the effects of these third party entities, and taking a
user-centric view to studying and enhancing privacy. However,
they generally do not explore the impact of industry and
country-level policy on the overall incidence of these third
parties. Connolly comes the closest, performing an evaluation
of various websites’ compliance with the European Union’s
“Safe Harbor” privacy policy. Finding an astoundingly small
subset of companies in compliance with Safe Harbor direc-
tives, Connolly discusses the “significant” privacy risk to con-
sumers resulting from noncompliance [20]. Issues like these
raise the necessity for a more comprehensive measurement of
jurisdictional differences in tracking and advertising activity.
D. Web Measurement Methodology
Englehardt et al. conducted a study that reviewed gen-
eral experimental frameworks and performed methodological
analyses of extant web measurement studies. They found
that web measurement studies are considered challenging for
two reasons: causality and automation [15]. Controlled and
randomized experiments are difficult in the dynamic, ever-
changing web ecosystem [21]. Automation is difficult for
several reasons, including that an automated script cannot
always mimic real user behavior in browsers [15]. These
difficulties has lead to some inconsistency and reinvention in
web measurement. In order to address these issues, Engelhardt
et al. authors developed a platform, OpenWPM [5], that
addressed many of the issues of flexibility and scalability
surrounding past web measurement studies. OpenWPM is a
Python-based web-crawler framework using Selenium [22].
Due to its flexibility and convenience, it has been validated in
several studies [5] [15]. This framework is utilized in the work
in order to avoid further problems, especially those surround-
ing replication of effort and methodological inconsistencies.
III. METHOD
We developed an automated method for measuring web
privacy in different regulatory environments. We examined
the quantity and type of web cookies set and third-party
HTTP requests made when browsing to popular sites from
different countries. To do so, we automated web browsing to
the 250 sites (as determined by Alexa) in different countries at
simultaneously. We collected data about the browsing sessions,
including the HTTP requests and cookies. We then used
a heuristic to examine results specifically related to web
tracking. Finally, we used statistical analysis to compare the
differences between countries.
For this method, we needed to overcome several techno-
logical hurdles, such as automating browsing from several
countries in a controlled manner. To control for the impact
of timing, we run the tests from multiple countries at the
simultaneously [21]. Furthermore, we needed a method to
determine whether the HTTP requests and cookies were third-
party URLs and related to web tracking. In the next subsec-
tions, we describe how our method addresses these issues.
A. Sourcing requests from several different countries
We have chosen Germany to represent the comprehensive
model, the United States and Japan to represent the sectoral
model, and Australia to represent the co-regulatory model.
Therefore, we sourced our data collection from four different
locations.
To source an internet connection point at these various
locations around the world, we used Amazon Web Services, or
AWS 1. AWS provides cloud-based virtual machines that can
be configured in numerous ways. We installed OpenWPM on
these machines and ran our tests from the cloud without having
to rely on a proxy to set our location. AWS offers virtual
1http://aws.amazon.com
machines in any of the following locations: Virginia (US),
Ireland (EU), Frankfurt (EU), Oregon (US), California (US),
Singapore (Asia), Sydney (AU), Sao Paolo (South America),
and Tokyo (JP) [23]. This covers almost all of the regions we
would like to examine – the only regions not represented are
Russia and China which are currently not options when using
AWS EC2. AWS employs a ’pay-for-what-you-use’ model, so
it is economically convenient to use. For example, running our
study cost under $5 USD given Amazon’s pricing schedule as
of November 20142.
B. Selecting which sites to visit
For each country, we crawled the top 250 sites for that
country using the Alexa list by country 3. Typically these
are top level domains and not subpages within a site. While
there was some overlap of sites between countries, such
as google.com and wikipedia.org, there were differences
between the country lists. First, some domains were specific
to the country, such as facebook.de in Germany. Second,
many sites were specific to that country or language. One
example of a website specific to Germany is the domain for
a popular news journal Der Spiegel (spiegel.de), which
was not seen on the other country lists.
C. Automating the web crawls
Our next step was to automate the data collection. We
collected a number of metrics related to tracking, including
the number of cookies and HTTP requests. Engelhardt et
al.’s OpenWPM platform is a purpose-built web measurement
platform that logs a large amount of web session data in a stan-
dardized SQLite database format, making it the perfect tool
for our study. We utilized the most recent publicly available
version of OpenWPM, 0.2.0, for the data collection portion
of our study and used the platform’s API to programmatically
crawl a list of the top 250 websites as defined by Alexa [3].
OpenWPM’s Firefox backend was used for the crawl with both
JavaScript and Flash enabled.
Two variables of interest are located within different SQLite
tables generated by OpenWPM with each crawl: cookies
and http_requests. We extracted the domains of cookies
and the URLs of HTTP requests from these two tables by
using Python’s sqlite3 library module.
D. Extracting Third-party HTTP requests and cookies
In this study, we were not interested in analyzing first-
party cookies and HTTP requests, as these are often not
considered privacy invasive [24]. Therefore, we had to extract
the third-party elements of our collected data. In order to
further analyze third-party cookies and HTTP requests, we
set a rule to determine whether the URL in a record is related
to the website where the record was extracted. To be more
specific, if the URL in a record does not contain the domain
name of the website we are currently visiting, it is a third-party
cookie or HTTP request. For example, if a cookie is extracted
2We used t2.small instances running Linux at $0.026 per CPU hour.
3http://www.alexa.com/topsites/
from amazon.de and the URL is fls-eu.amazon.de, it
is a first-party cookie because the base domain is identical. In
contrast, if a cookie also extracted from amazon.de has the
domain zanox.com, then the domains are not identical and
it is a third-party cookie. By implementing these procedures,
we can use statistical tools to analyze the collected data.
E. Tracker Heuristic: AdBlock “easylists”
Not all the URLs identified using the above method are
necessarily related to advertising or web tracking. They may
also be first-party content hosted on content management
networks or separate servers maintained by the first party.
Therefore, we used an additional heuristic to determine which
URLs were related to web tracking and advertising.
AdBlock Plus [4] is a popular browser extension available
for both Firefox and Chrome which allows users to filter and
block elements on a webpage according to user-specified rules.
As evidenced by the extension name, this capability is most of-
ten used in service of blocking advertisements, tracking code,
or other content deemed annoying, invasive, or objectionable.
Due to its open source nature and large, international user
base, AdBlock Plus provides a unique resource: a large, crowd-
sourced list of rules that allows us to detect the presence of
advertising or tracking assets within a list of URLs and page
elements. These rules are compiled in two “easylists” [25]
provided on the AdBlock website, with one focused on ad-
blocking rules and the other focused on tracker-blocking rules.
Using a similar approach to the one detailed in the last
section, we extracted the full URLs of HTTP requests and
responses from the OpenWPM crawl database using Python
and the sqlite3 library. We then used the adblockparser
[26] Python module to match the extracted HTTP request
and response URLs against the two sets of AdBlock rules
mentioned above. The number of positive ad or tracker hits
were aggregated by domain, country, and rule set in order
to produce summary statistics for use in further analysis. (In
this paper, we are using the term “hit” to denote one of these
positive pattern matches between an AdBlock easylist rule and
the domain or URL seen in an HTTP request or cookie.)
IV. RESULTS
We ran our script on the top 250 sites for each of our four
countries. We collected all the HTTP requests and cookies
from these browsing sessions and then used the heuristic
and algorithm described in the previous section to identify
probable tracker activity. We found that visiting the sites
from the US yielded the most third-party HTTP requests and
third-party cookies. Through additional comparisons with a
dataset based on the top 500 sites globally, we also found
indications that other factors besides user origin may come
into play. For example, a website’s country of origin or a
server’s physical location may have even more impact than
a user’s geographic location. Differences between countries
with the same regulatory model could also indicate differences
stemming from other cultural, business, and political factors.
TABLE I
RANK OF THE NUMBER OF THIRD-PARTY HTTP DOMAIN REQUESTS
AMONG DIFFERENT COUNTRIES USING A KRUSKAL-WALLIS TEST. THE
US HAD SIGNIFICANTLY MORE THIRD-PARTY HTTP REQUESTS THAN THE
OTHER COUNTRIES.
country Rank
US 575.00
AU 511.79
DE 492.52
JP 406.69
A. Evaluation Metric: Third-Party Cookies and Requests
The goal of our study was to discover the variation in track-
ing activity between different countries. Due to the categorical-
quantitative nature of our data, a one-way ANOVA model was
deemed appropriate for our analyses. More specifically, all
data was analyzed using the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test
due to the the variable sample size and non-normality of our
samples. This allowed comparisons of tracking activity across
varying levels of country, our independent variable.
There are some dependent variables we used for further
analysis. First, we analyzed the number of third-party cookies
and HTTP requests, which is closely related to online tracking
activity. Second, we examined first and third-party cookies
and HTTP requests to see whether the ratios were identical
in different countries. Since the raw counts of cookies and
requests were not normalized, this helped us to understand the
relative proportions of the two types of cookies and requests
for different segments of our data. Additionally, the number of
first-party cookies and HTTP requests were analyzed because
some sites (e.g., Google) are both an analytics provider and a
service provider, as such they may use other methods besides
third-party cookies to track users.
B. Third-party HTTP requests
We compared the number of third-party HTTP domain
requests among different countries. Table I shows the aver-
age rank for each country in Kruskal-Wallis test. We found
that the difference of the numbers of third-party domain
of HTTP requests among our four countries are significant
(χ2 = 43.863; df = 3; p < 0.0005). We also found that there
are more third-party HTTP requests in the US compared to
Germany and Australia (χ2 = 10.752; df = 1; p = 0.001). The
differences between Germany and Australia were not signifi-
cant. Moreover, there were more third-party HTTP requests in
Germany and Australia compared to Japan (χ2 = 39.709; df =
1; p < 0.0005).
C. Cookies
We also compared the number of third-party and first party
cookies among different countries. Table II shows the average
rank of number of third-party cookies for each country in
Kruskal-Wallis test. Although the difference in total number of
first-party cookies is not significant, the difference of number
of third-party cookies is significant (χ2 = 13.147; df = 2; p =
0.004). This implies that, generally, a visitor to one of the
TABLE II
RANK OF THE NUMBER OF THIRD-PARTY COOKIES AMONG DIFFERENT
COUNTRIES USING A KRUSKAL-WALLIS TEST.
country Rank
US 499.14
DE 445.51
AU 438.53
JP 411.91
TABLE III
CORRELATION BETWEEN NUMBER OF HTTP REQUESTS AND COOKIES
Country r
AU 0.691
DE 0.634
JP 0.778
US 0.715
top 250 sites from the United States would be exposed to a
comparatively greater amount of web tracking code.
We found similar results when comparing the number
of domains in third-party HTTP requests. There are more
third-party cookies in the US compared to Germany (χ2 =
4.111; df = 1; p = 0.043) and Australia. Also, the difference
between Germany, Australia, and Japan is not significant.
D. Correlation between HTTP requests and cookies
Table III shows the correlation between the number of third-
party domain for HTTP requests and third-party cookies. We
found that in these countries these two variables are strongly
correlated. Furthermore, the high correlation coefficients for
all countries in our data demonstrates a good level of internal
validity for our two measures of online tracking. This indicates
a sufficient level of confidence in the underlying construct that
we are attempting to measure. Additionally, this also shows
that HTTP requests can be a good measure of tracking in
addition to the already established cookie measure.
E. Evaluation Metric: AdBlock rules
1) Origin-dependent tracking activity: One crucial phe-
nomenon to test for is the presence of origin-dependent
tracking activity–in other words, we wanted to determine if the
origin of the user was important or if the origin of the website
was important. For example: if user A visits example.com from
country A and user B also visits example.com at the same
time, but from country B, will they receive the same type and
number of trackers? This analysis was done to determine how
heavily geographic factors need to be controlled for in this
(and other) studies. Finding that the users’ source matters may
indicate interesting, adaptive behavior by tracking companies
that could warrant further investigation.
To this end, we crawled Alexa’s list of the top 500 global
sites from all four of our server locations at identical times and
compared matches against Adblock’s tracking EasyList. Con-
trolling for outliers, nonparametric tests of both the absolute
number of hits by country and the proportions of hits by coun-
try show no significant difference (n hits: χ2 = 0.805; df =
3; p > 0.84, proportion: χ2 = 0.172; df = 3; p > 0.98).
Because of this, we can conclude that the impact of request
origin will not be a significant factor for us within the scope
of our experiment.
This conclusion is further bolstered by an interesting pos-
sibility that stems from a comparison of our country-specific
datasets with our new, global dataset. Looking at the series
of pairwise comparisons for the top 500 sites (see Table VII),
none of the differences between countries are significant (all
p > 0.71). This indicates that it may be the website’s country
origin, not the user’s, that matters in terms of tracking activity
present. However, there may be other factors that account for
this difference in variation, something that will be expanded
on in our discussion.
2) More trackers than ads: There were significant differ-
ences in type of hit (trackers vs. advertisements) within the
same top 500 sites. The proportion of requests associated with
trackers was significantly higher than the proportion associated
with advertisements (χ2 = 45.1; p < 0.0001). A pairwise
comparison across the top 500 sites showed that trackers
accounted for approximately 2% more requests than advertise-
ments (95%CI[0.015, 0.021]). This is significant considering
the overall proportion of requests for both ads and trackers
is 5.4% (SEMean = 0.0009, 95%CI[0.052, 0.056]). Since
trackers, as opposed to ads, do not usually have a visual
element, this may imply a “tip of the iceberg” issue for users.
While awareness of online advertising may be relatively high,
the invisibility of online tracking for the typical user may lead
to a false sense of privacy for some.
3) Differences by country: Based on our limited sample of
countries per regulatory model, we do not draw conclusions
about the regulatory models themselves. We do find interesting
results when examining each individual country in a series
of pairwise comparisons between the top 250 sites in each
country. Differences in the proportion of total HTTP requests
associated with trackers differs significantly and may imply the
presence of significant variation beyond what can be explained
on the country or model level.
4) More tracking-related requests in the United States:
A pairwise examination of the proportion of HTTP requests
related to tracking activity (operationalized as the proportion
of requests that matched an Adblock rule) show that United
States has significantly more tracking activity compared to all
of our other countries. While the differences varied by country,
each comparison showed a significantly greater (at least p <
0.02) percentage of tracking requests, ranging from less than
1% (US-AU) to more than 3% (US-JP). Table VI displays
these pairwise tests, along with confidence intervals, in more
detail.
5) Differences within the sectoral model: It is especially
interesting to note the comparisons between our two sectoral
model countries, the United States and Japan. Even though
they ostensibly have the same regulatory model, the United
States showed a significantly greater (all p < 0.02) amount of
tracking-related HTTP requests (anywhere from 2.8% to 4%
more). Considering the average number of requests per page
is over 100, even a 4% increase in tracking-related requests
TABLE IV
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ALL TRACKING-RELATED HTTP REQUESTS
N Mean Requests (SD) Mean Hits (SD) Mean Proportion Hits (SD)
1931 111 (116) 6.54 (7.7) 0.06 (0.05)
TABLE V
SUMMARY STATISTICS BY COUNTRY FOR TRACKING-RELATED HTTP REQUESTS
Country Mean(Number Requests)
Mean
(Number Hits)
Mean
(Proportion hits)
Std Dev
(Number Requests)
Std Dev
(Number Hits)
Std Dev
(Proportion hits)
AU 99.19 6.83 0.06 80.70 7.0 0.05
DE 121.04 5.70 0.05 160.74 6.31 0.05
JP 103.15 4.10 0.05 101.64 4.82 0.05
US 120.59 9.34 0.08 105.10 10.41 0.05
TABLE VI
PAIRWISE COMPARISONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES FOR TRACKING HITS
Country A Country B Z p 95% CI For Change
US JP 10.42 <.0001 [0.028, 0.040]
US DE 7.77 <.0001 [0.018, 0.031]
US AU 2.57 <.02 [0.001, 0.014]
JP DE -3.64 <.0005 [-0.013, -0.002]
DE AU -5.29 <.0001 [-0.021, -0.009]
AU AU -8.33 <.0001 [-0.031, -0.019]
TABLE VII
PAIRWISE COMPARISONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES FOR TOP 500 GLOBAL
SITES
Country A Country B p
JP DE 0.855
JP AU 0.963
US DE 0.859
DE AU 0.838
US JP 0.739
US AU 0.714
could indicate the loading of 4 to 5 more tracking elements or
scripts per browsing session. This can be seen in the summary
statistics shown in Table IV, which displays the mean number
of HTTP requests, hits, and hits as a proportion of total
requests for the browsing sessions.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Outliers
We are also interested in outliers about tracking behav-
iors in the websites. For example, the US, nydailynews.
com has the most number of third-party cookies in top
250 websites. There are 6,546 third-party cookies set when
when that website is visited. Other news websites including
foxnews.com, sfgate.com, drudgereport.com and
nypost.com all have more than 900 third-party cookies.
Similarly, we found that news websites also play important
roles in Japan and Australia’s third-party cookie statistics.
The site theaustralian.com.au has 1,819 third-party
cookies on its website, which is the third most in their top
250 websites. In addition, in Japan, reuters.com has 1,827
third-party cookies, which is the most in top 250 websites. The
finding is interesting because it implies that news websites rely
on third-party cookies heavily in the US, Japan, and Australia.
However in Germany, the tracking behaviors are not similar
to other three countries because most of third-party cookies
are set by shopping websites instead of news websites.
B. Other factors
Currently, we do not have enough data to conclusively say
whether the different privacy regulatory models are actually
statistically different from one another in practice. However,
we did find evidence that privacy regulatory models alone may
not indicate the level of technological privacy users get. For
instance, we noticed that the US had many more tracking
indicators than Japan overall, even though they both follow
the sectoral model. We are unsure of exactly why this is the
case but we suspect that it may be due to cultural differences
or perhaps the types of websites that are popular. It could be
the case that the popular sites in Japan fall under a particular
sector that is more regulated than those in the US.
Another possibility along these lines is that tracking, ad-
vertising, and the sale of customer data is not the most
popular business model for websites in Japan – another
factor that could lead to the differences in tracking we saw.
Furthermore, this type of motivation could actually be related
to our findings in the realm of news websites. Due to the
shifting media landscape in many countries, newspapers and
other journalistic organizations are constantly looking for new
sources of revenue. Some sources put online advertising at
roughly 20 percent of advertising revenue and this, along with
other cultural and corporate factors, may contribute to the
disproportionately large amount of advertising and tracking
found on news sites [27].
C. Limitations
A study collecting data from sources as dynamic as a
popular website may encounter several issues with external
validity. For example, the tracking activity present on a site
may not be entirely deterministic given a certain page load
– factors such as time of day and previous user activity
may lead to differing types of activity behind the scenes
[28]. Further confounds such as the automated nature of
our data gathering process may introduce other sources of
variation; for example, many EU-targeted sites do not set
cookies unless a user explicitly opts in as a result of regulatory
action [29]. While some related confounds like time of day
were controlled for, the numerous sources of variation may
warrant a follow-up study to assess the external validity of our
data collection methods. Finally, our we recognize that these
factors lead to an imperfect operationalization of tracking.
Indeed, the complex inter-session and inter-device nature of
modern tracking technology provide challenges for the web
measurement and privacy research community. However, these
challenges do provide promising avenues for future work and
investigation.
D. Future work
Since we were unable to access a node in China and Russia
from which to run our script, we have no direct representation
of the no privacy model regions. We initially thought that
this would directly affect our ability to measure tracking
properly but our results have shown that where we connect
to a particular website from may have very little to do with
tracking. This result is based on a small sample (just the US
and Japan) so we would also like to verify this fact over a
longer period of time and with more countries prior to making
a concrete conclusion. China may be an exception to this
finding since they have the “Great Firewall of China” in place
which may distort our results.
Russia is another interesting case and doesn’t have the
complication of a national firewall. Russia’s government has
been taking an increasingly aggressive interest in the internet,
recently going so far as commandeering the Vkontakte, the
‘Facebook of Russia’ [30]. Extending our study to incorporate
these two countries seems very promising since it could yield
results that are very different from what we have seen in our
current study. In the case of China, AWS EC2 is currently in
open beta (for Chinese residents only) for nodes in Beijing.
Setting up a node there may be possible in the near future.
This would also give us the ability to measure and compare
tracking in China from inside and outside the firewall.
It may be valuable to conduct this study again in the
future as well. Doing so would allow comparison of tracking
throughout time and such time-series data could grant us
greater causal and explanatory power in a variety of situations.
For instance, there may be value in examining changes in
tracking after privacy-related news or policy events. If Do
Not Track becomes a widely accepted standard, how different
will the tracking landscape look? Would tracking increase or
decrease for people not utilizing Do Not Track? Similarly, we
could examine if major regulatory rulings by relevant agencies
create noticeable change. If the FTC steps up enforcement in
a particular area, is there a visible effect of that ruling?
Another valuable extension to our study would be to more
deeply examine other methods of tracking. Third-party cook-
ies, third-party HTTP requests, and AdBlock rules don’t tell
the whole story. For example, even though Google has very
few third-party cookies or requests, it is well known that
Google tracks users throughout their systems using various
internal metrics [31]. In a similar vein, many major service
providers like Google are also their own analytics providers.
We do not account for this possibility in our study, but
developing methods for doing so may reveal a more complete
picture. In a similar vein, tracking is not a web-only construct;
similar “first-party” tracking metrics could look very different
on mobile, or other novel platforms.
Finally, we would like to investigate and better understand
more subtle country-level differences. For example, what is
causing the US to have much more tracking than Japan even
though they are both sectoral countries? We can hypothesize
that this may be cultural, or that the popular websites in
Japan differ in category from those in the US or that the
popular sites in Japan may fall under the regulation of a stricter
sector. Questions like these also leave open the possibility of
exploring more complex issues at the intersection of privacy,
policy, and culture. For instance, richer data at a more granular
level could help highlight the interaction between the effects
of culture on Internet use, businesses’ data collection habits,
and regulation.
Since none of these questions can be fully explored with our
data, additional research would have to be done to confirm
or deny these assumptions. We expect collaboration with
economists and local legal and cultural experts could improve
understanding in this area. However, once these questions have
been answered satisfactorily, we may be closer to evaluating
how effective the regulatory models actually are for protecting
end users—certainly a question of great importance to all
stakeholders. Such information would also open up many
relevant paths of inquiry and discussion for the privacy and
policy communities, from the challenges of defining a privacy
standard to the difficulties of translating regulation into com-
pliance and enforcement in a global, networked environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Going into this experiment, we assumed that there would be
a significant difference in tracking between countries in dif-
ferent privacy regulatory models. We expected to see the most
tracking in the no-model and sectoral model countries, less in
the co-regulatory model, and even less in the comprehensive
model. To examine this, we developed an empirical, repeatable
method to evaluate web tracking in different countries. This
method can be used in future studies to measure the impact
of policy changes.
We were also interested in determining if the country the
website is based in, versus the country we are connecting from,
plays a role in the amount of tracking. Due to our limited sam-
ple size, though, we were not able to draw strong conclusions
regarding the regulatory models themselves. However, we
were able to quantify many interesting variations in tracking
behavior between countries and provide several directions for
relevant future work to further investigate these variations. We
were able to conclude that there were significant differences
in tracking activity between different countries using several
metrics.
The subtle country level difference indicate that the pri-
vacy regulatory model are not the sole factor impacting web
tracking. For example, the US has much more tracking than
Japan even though they are both sectoral countries. This may
be cultural, as the popular websites in one country may differ
in category from those in another country due to a cultural
preference to view different types of websites. Alternatively,
the popular sites in a country may fall under the regulation
of a stricter sector, or web sites (such as national news
organizations) may enjoy financial support that allows them to
rely less on advertising. These options highlight that privacy
may be impacted by regulation and culture that is not directly
about privacy or data sharing. Further exploration is needed
on these complex issues at the intersection of digital privacy,
policy, and culture.
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